WaPo Toes The Line

Reading Sunday's papers, I was disappointed to read the lead editorial in The Washington Post, titled "Countering Iran." In it, the editorial staff argue in favour of current US and Israeli policy vis a vis Iran, advocate an expanded program to "nurture'" a region-wide "popular backlash against Iran's military adventurism,", and conclude that "it nevertheless is inevitable that Iran's proxies in Iraq, Gaza and Lebanon will have to be countered in part by military force..."

While there is nothing wrong with debating strategy and offering possible solutions to a potentially dangerous situation, the Post staff use misleading statements and push policies that have been shown to be either ineffective or disastrously counter-productive.

To start, the writers roll right along the standard Israeli list of charges against Iran, culminating in a line constructed as if straight from an IDF spokesman. "He [Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] said 6,000 more centrifuges were being installed at an existing enrichment plant, which would give Iran the capacity to produce the core of a bomb in a matter of months."

In the very next sentence, they say a December National Intelligence Estimate "misleadingly emphasized Iran's reported decision to put one part of its nuclear program on hold."

On the one hand, the writers wish to hype what has been described by analysts as a questionable and likely exaggerated claim to progress. And on the other, they dismiss a US intelligence assessment, though disputed by some partisans upon release, as "misleading."

While the editorial picks and chooses which information fits the pre-determined opinion, it trumpets the worst-case scenario to the nuclear dispute. That 6,000 centrifuges can produce enough uranium to create a single nuclear device "in a matter of months" is true 'in theory,' as they begin in offering another sage recommendation, but that technology is not the only ingredient to developing nuclear weapons. Other processes that are necessary to enriching uranium have been met with frequent delays and outright failure by Iranian scientists. In addition, the progress claimed by Iran has been met with international skepticism throughout the more than five year diplomatic crisis. Following the embarrassing disqualification of the American case against Saddam Hussein-led Iraq, US officials should be particularly cautious of basing policy on worst-case possibilities, something the writers seem to support.

Moving to Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, more misleading arguments attempt to portray an emerging Iranian threat demanding immediate action if it is to be stopped.

Hizb'allah, they write, has "paralyzed" the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. Indeed it has. What the writers leave out in irresponsibly brief summarisations of intricate theatres is the mutual standoff between Hizb'allah and the Western-backed government, as well as the demographic politics that are at a crossroads in battered Lebanon.

Once a state organised to favour the Christian elite, Lebanon has now come to a moment of critical mass where the shi'i population outnumbers all other sects yet is still represented in government as a minority under the old system of confessionalism. Hizb'allah has seized this moment in time, emboldened by the 2006 war, to force more power and parliamentary seats to be given to the shi'a, and as the public face, their group.

The government, weakened since the political confrontation in late 2006 with shi'i parties thanks to failed economic programs and the appearance of weakness during the war, has refused to compromise, along with other members of the March 14 coalition of anti-Syrian parties.

During the war, government ally, the United States, delayed an end to conflict in a deliberate stalling tactic to allow more Hizb'allah positions in South Lebanon to be destroyed in the hopes of reducing the capability of the group in the future - Ms. Rice and then-Ambassador to the UN John Bolton led the dirty diplomatic campaign. The tearful television appearances of Mr. Siniora as he pleaded for an end to the violence, heavily centered on shi'a neighbourhoods of the capital, Beirut, while the war carried on for several weeks more, left the prime minister neutered in the eyes of the shi'i community, as well as in other communities of Lebanon. In addition, bitterness prevailed as it was seen by shi'i that Mr. Siniora and the government did nothing to stop the war, and that its ally, the US, had orchestrated the war - it was later learned that Bush administration officials had given the Israeli government approval to launch an operation, but to what scale, extent and under which terms isn't clear.

The United Nations, typically a target of criticism by hawkish foreign policy wonks, is here knocked for having "never made a serious effort to prevent Hezbollah from reconstituting the military capacity it lost in a 2006 fight with Israel" - I notice that that bloody 34-day Israeli adventure is not deemed worthy of the title 'war' by the editorial staff of The Washington Post despite the deaths of more than 1,100 Lebanese and Israelis. It is true that the UNIFIL force already in place in Lebanon before the war and those added afterwards were not charged with disarming Hizb'allah. But if the Post writers wish to critique anyone, let it be their own government officials, like Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The habit of hawks has been to address Hizb'allah as 'Iranian-backed,' ignoring the role it plays in Lebanese politics and society. Hizb'allah receives support from Iran through Syria, that is not in doubt. But the reduction of this group and its appeal to Lebanese shi'i to an arm of mullahs and nothing more misleads the public and, in fact, inflames the already tense relationships between Hizb'allah and its opponents within and without Lebanon, and the Western-Iranian impasse.

In Israel-Palestine, the Post staffers write of "Hamas cadres that have...been trained and equipped by Iran's Revolutionary Guard," failed attempts by Israel to "stop Hamas's buildup in Gaza," and Israel's hope "that by forging a peace deal with moderate Palestinian leaders it will wean the population of Gaza away from Hamas."

More than five years into the war in Iraq, there have been early and often re-evaluations of US policy by the public, academics and pundits. Criticism, in this war, has been a constant debate that has coloured every discussion. In Israel, a similar debate rages on about the 2006 war in Lebanon and the highly-charged question of the Palestinian territories. The Winograd commission, assembled to analyze the Lebanon war, handed down judgements that criticised both the prime minister and his cabinet, as well as, though in a much more reserved manner, the IDF. The Post editorial, however, like it's characterisation of Lebanon, leaves many details unwritten.

Beginning with US policy campaigning for democratic elections, Hamas came to power in a nearly universally-described free and fair vote. A united front by the US, Israel and some nations of a divided European Union took effect that aimed to force Hamas to renounce violence, disarm, and recognise the state of Israel. Refusing to comply, an economic blockade against the Palestinian territories was instituted and kept in place since, causing numerous internal street battles between Fatah and Hamas over civil servant pay and other outbreaks of public protest.

While Israel and Hizb'allah fought in Lebanon in 2006, Hamas sparked an Israeli offensive into Gaza after capturing an IDF soldier. The intent of Israeli actions, however, like in Lebanon, weren't merely to retrieve kidnapped soldiers but to inflict significant damage on two enemies of the state. Ending with IDF troops returning to Israeli territory, other offensives followed, none to the scale of the June 2006 operation. The impact of IDF actions and the economic blockade in response to political developments contributed to the environment of desperation among Palestinians in Gaza, where, despite deteriorating conditions, Hamas was still seen as fighting for the people.

In the following years, Fatah, led by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, remained the only recognised representative of the Palestinian territories. As the US and Israel sought to "stop Hamas's buildup in Gaza," the personal bodyguard of Mr. Abbas was supplied with arms and its members given training. Unlike most personal security forces, Abbas's numbered in the thousands and was, in reality, a branch of Fatah's military wing, which, years prior, was labeled a 'terrorist' group by the US and Israel.

In 2007, Hamas took the simmering power struggle with US and Israeli-armed Fatah to the next level, seizing control of Gaza's government from Fatah officials - the forced expulsion of Gazans that supported Fatah added to the fear caused by the de facto coup. Earlier that year, Mr. Abbas dissolved the government, saying a resolution was impossible and new elections should decide the next government. However, with the government and the people divided, no agreements could be made to organise new elections. Now controlling an entire territory of Palestine, Hamas began governing Gaza, while Fatah maintained it was the only rightful representative of the people of Palestine.

Clumped together with Hizb'allah as an agent of Iran, Hamas is also simplified by the Post writers, and the conflict in which it functions wholly ignored except as part of a regional Iranian "offensive." The writers describe "Hamas's buildup in Gaza" as though it were an alien action unrelated and unconnected to anything but a regional strategy controlled from Tehran.

To Iraq, the writers, and Messrs. Petraeus and Crocker, cite a recent rocket attack on the Green Zone in Baghdad and "Iranian-trained militants [Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army] who stiffened the resistance to Iraqi government forces trying to gain control over the southern city of Basra" as evidence that Iran is now "the largest remaining threat" in Iraq.

In some rocket attacks, the weaponry used has been found to have been manufactured in Iran, suggesting government elements in Iran are arming shi'i militias in the fight against the government and sunni insurgents. Never mind that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's al-Dawa party is closer to the Iranian shi'a community than al-Sadr's Mahdi Army or that the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, headed by Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and its Badr Brigade also shares a warmer relationship with Iran than the "Iranian-trained militants" of al-Sadr. The Mahdi is a fundamentally nationalist movement and can be said to be a sort of voice of the 'street' or the poor among the shi'i of Iraq. Whether munitions used are from Iran or not doesn't in and of itself indicate official Iranian involvement - the black market is utilised more by Iraqis than the average street market, especially when it comes to weapons and combat supplies. Does this mean the Iranian Quds Force and/or the government isn't ensuring a free-flow of supplies from their territory into Iraq or that Tehran isn't, in fact, directly arming, funding and training some of the shi'i militias? Indeed not. It is probable that some outfit of the Iranian military, with or without the support of senior levels of the government, is encouraging if not aiding the efforts of the shi'i militias to accumulate local and national power while ensuring Iraqi sunni's are kept in the minority. What is apparent of constantly evolving US policy, however, is that ideology and pre-determined assumptions play too much of a part in guiding the decision-making of the civilian leadership.

The writers take the testimony of Messrs. Petraeus and Crocker a step further than those men were willing to go when pressed by senators as to how much of a threat is Iran to US goals in Iraq and how should it be confronted.

Addressing Iran as "the largest remaining threat" and summarising the congressional testimony as the "story of a larger failure: the inability of the United States and its allies to contain the growing aggressiveness of Iran," the Post staffers seem to suggest that absent Iranian influence among the militias, the situation in Iraq would be significantly improved. It is certainly correct that violence and perhaps the rivalries seen among the shi'i might decline if Iran were not involved, directly or indirectly. However, the emphasis on Iran deflects from core problems relating to the political-sectarian divisions, the reliance on local parties and militias instead of the central government, and the inability of the government to function effectively, owing in part to the softened yet still rigid relationship between shi'a and sunni parties. Absent security threats, the state of Iraq will not come together overnite or even, perhaps, in a decade. It is the constant reassignment of end points, each one a finish line to the start of another marathon, that keeps the war feeling a series of turning points that have Americans and Iraqis turned round on themselves several times over. And the Post staffers have played no small part in this cycle, here now arguing the next and "last" goal will lead to better times and the validation of a costly war.

In a sweeping statement, the Post staffers suggest a regional strategy at a time when the Middle East is still reverberating from the impact of the last regional strategy in democratisation. "In theory," the writers argue, "a popular backlash against Iran's military adventurism could be nurtured across the Middle East." With anti-Americanism and "a popular backlash" in full effect against democracy that people in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Egypt see as those parties favoured by the United States win, the idea by the writers that a campaign could be attempted to foment anti-Iranianism in any of the swing states of the region is plainly naive or ideological. In an editorial short on explanation and long on talking points, I am assuming this apparent recommendation wasn't filler or a casual hypothetical, but a specific point. And with their next statement, the editorial staff of the Post get to the point of their writing and make clear what their intentions are.

"It nevertheless is inevitable," they write, "that Iran's proxies in Iraq, Gaza and Lebanon will have to be countered in part by military force, while diplomatic and economic pressure aimed at stopping Tehran's nuclear program is stepped up." Here, at the end of the editorial, the Post staffers argue what is essentially the position of the Bush administration and foreign policy hawks, primarily on the right wing of politics.

Perhaps Iran will have to be confronted, directly or through satellites. At the present time, however, the situation across the Middle East could not be any worse from an American perspective. The idea that a Mid-East offensive is underway that threatens regional allies and Western powers - wasn't that what the US was fighting yesterday as Al-Qa'ida spread like a brush fire, or has that hyperbole been forgotten already? - and must be confronted actively and immediately is a bit like asking America to go to Korea after just gotten back from World War II. Iraq and that sweeping conflict certainly aren't comparable, but the level of exhaustion on the part of the America people is. And a nation spooked by threats of mushroom clouds and falling towers, since enduring a lengthy nation-building campaign that carries the fate of the world and none of it on its bloody shoulders, is in no mood and probably doesn't have the stomach for another ideologically-conceived adventure that must come, will come and cannot come.

"Threaded through" the editorial, as they would write, is a clear given that Iran is the key to Iraq and the region, and whose threat is real and emerging. What is also clear is the weakness of the argument the editorial staff of The Washington Post uses to make their point.

If Iran is as serious a threat as they write, why the need to view the relationship between Hizb'allah and Lebanon in a vacuum, as though the group were a mindless, robotic puppet of Iran? If the threat is real, why is Iraq held back by only Iranian influence, as it was by so many of the once final "remaining threats" that gave way to newer, more potentially disastrous threats, from "Ba'athist remnants" to "dead-enders" to "foreign fighters"?

It is disappointing to see The Washington Post print such shoddy work. I realise that it was an editorial, but I think readers would want to read editorials that, at the very least, aren't so much talking points and don't short shrift the details.

**As some observant commentors have pointed out, 'toe' or 'toes' would be the proper way to spell the phrase in the title. Though I've seen it used both ways, I agree that the proper spelling should be preferable in most cases unless otherwise intended for dramatic effect. Thanks for the kind, constructive comments.**

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